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The Interrelation between Audit Quality and Managerial Reporting Choices  




 Two distinct lines of research have been dedicated to empirically testing how financial 
reporting quality (measured as the earnings response coefficient or ERC) is associated with 
management's choice of reporting bias and with audit quality. However, researchers have yet to 
consider how ERCs are affected by either the auditor's reaction to changes in the manager’s 
reporting bias or the manager’s reaction to changes in audit quality.  Our study provides 
theoretical guidance on these interrelations, and how changes in the manager’s or the auditor’s 
incentives affect both reporting bias and audit quality.  Specifically, when the manager’s cost 
(benefit) of reporting bias increases (decreases), we find that expected bias decreases, inducing 
the auditor to react by reducing audit quality.  Because we also find that the association between 
expected audit quality and ERCs is always positive, changes in managerial incentives for biased 
reporting lead to a positive association between ERCs and expected reporting bias.  When the 
cost of auditing decreases or the cost of auditor liability increases, we find that expected audit 
quality increases, inducing the manager to react by decreasing reporting bias.  In this case, 
changes in the costs of audit quality lead to a negative association between ERCs and expected 
reporting bias. Finally, we demonstrate the impact of our theoretical findings by focusing on the 
empirical observations documented in the extant literature on managerial ownership and 
accounting expertise on the audit committee.  In light of our framework, we provide new 
interpretations of these empirical observations and new predictions for future research.   
  
  
The Interrelation between Audit Quality and Managerial Reporting Choices  
and Its Effects on Financial Reporting Quality  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Two distinct lines of research have been dedicated to empirically testing how financial 
reporting quality is associated with management's choice of reporting bias and with audit quality. 
The extant literature has typically treated these two relationships either as independent of one 
another, or as interchangeable.  The manager chooses an amount of reporting bias and the auditor 
chooses a level of audit quality.  However, neither reporting bias nor audit quality affects the 
usefulness of financial reporting in isolation.  The auditor’s strategy affects the manager’s 
reporting strategy, and conversely, the manager’s reporting strategy affects the auditor’s strategy, 
because the auditor’s and manager’s incentives are interdependent.  DeFond and Zhang (2014) 
express concern about the mixed treatment of this interrelation by empirical researchers.  They 
suggest, “…research would benefit from more conceptual guidance in disentangling the complex 
relation between audit quality and financial reporting quality (p. 279).”   This paper provides 
theoretical guidance on the joint strategic effects that the manager's choice of reporting bias and 
the auditor's choice of audit quality have on the usefulness of financial reporting.   
Consider how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) might affect this joint 
interaction.  SOX instituted new audit committee requirements that boosted the independence of 
audit committee members and increased the financial competency of the audit committee.  The 
extant literature provides evidence that suggests that these efforts to increase the effectiveness of 
audit committees reduce managerial reporting bias by increasing the cost of misreporting (for a 
review, see Dechow, Ge, and Schrand  2010).  The presumption is that a decrease in bias would 
result in an increase in the usefulness of financial reporting.  However, the anticipated decrease 
in the manager’s reporting bias allows the auditor to rely more on the manager’s report and to 
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decrease his investment in audit procedures.  This interdependence could ultimately result in a 
decrease in the usefulness of financial reporting.  
The above example illustrates how empirical studies that examine managerial reporting 
bias and audit quality independently would fail to account for how these interrelations jointly 
affect the usefulness of financial reporting.  Examples include Warfield, Wild, and Wild's (1995) 
study on managerial ownership and Teoh and Wong's (1993) study on big-N auditors and ERCs.  
Accordingly, our study constructs a model that incorporates both reporting bias and audit quality 
in determining the usefulness of financial reporting.  In our setting, we characterize the 
usefulness of financial reporting as financial reporting quality, modeled as the stock market 
reaction to the audited financial report.  Further, we define audit quality as the probability that 
the auditor detects the manager’s financial reporting bias.1  An important attribute of our model 
is that we derive a linear equilibrium that yields empirically testable predictions.  
 To highlight the importance of auditing to financial reporting quality, we start with a 
benchmark setting where the probability of detecting bias is fixed and independent of the 
manager’s report.  In this setting, an exogenous increase in audit quality reduces reporting bias, 
but has no effect on the market’s response to reported earnings (i.e., financial reporting quality).  
However, when we add a strategic auditor to the model who endogenously uses the manager’s 
earnings report in choosing audit quality, financial reporting quality is affected and 
unambiguously increases relative to the benchmark setting.2  
                                               
1  Many studies use the terms audit quality and audit effort interchangeably.  Newman, Rhoades, and Smith (1996) 
discuss the different modeling approaches and show that they are strategically equivalent.  As such, we model 
the auditor’s choice as a choice of detection probability and refer to the auditor’s strategy as “audit quality” 
throughout.  
2  As we discuss in sections 2 and 3, the notion of exogenous versus endogenous changes in audit quality refer to 
whether or not the auditor observes the manager's report before choosing audit quality.  However, a change in 
audit quality only occurs if a payoff parameter of the game changes.  For the exogenous case, audit quality 
changes only when an auditor payoff parameter changes.  For the endogenous case, audit quality changes when 
either an auditor's or a manager's payoff parameter changes.  Consequently, if a firm changes from a non-big-N 
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 To model this interrelation, we consider the strategic interaction of a manager, an auditor, 
and market participants, all of whom are risk neutral.  The manager chooses an earnings report, 
and the auditor chooses audit quality, after observing the manager's report.  The market then sets 
the firm's price based on its reaction to the audited earnings report.  Each player makes his 
strategic choice based on the inferred behaviors of the others, which depend on the common 
knowledge of the players' payoff incentives.    
 The manager's choice of reporting bias depends on both private and public information 
about his reporting incentives.  He has two sources of private information that include: (1) true 
earnings; and, (2) his personal insensitivity to reporting bias.  He also derives a benefit from 
higher reported earnings and incurs a cost for reporting bias, such as the cost of overriding 
internal controls or a loss of reputation.  However, the impact of this cost is mitigated by his 
personal insensitivity to reporting bias, which is often referred to as "rationalization" in the 
auditing literature (see Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit AU-C 240.11).  
Collectively, the manager's payoffs and private information provide him incentives to 
intentionally overstate earnings for his own benefit.3  Moreover, because the manager has two 
sources of private information, neither the market nor the auditor can "back-out" reporting bias to 
perfectly infer true earnings from the report.4 
                                               
to a big-N auditor, expected audit quality increases in both cases due to a change in the underlying payoff 
parameters. 
3  While the financial reporting literature often refers to this type of reporting bias as earnings management, the 
auditing literature considers intentional misstatements that mislead the user of the report as fraud.  In our model, 
the intent to mislead is clear, because the earnings report affects the firm's price (AU-C 240.02).  Because the 
Securities and Exchange Commission defines earnings management as a “material and intentional 
misrepresentation” of a given entity’s reported operating results (see "Speech by SEC Staff: Corporate 
Responsibility and the Audit Committee" on March 21, 2000, by John Morrissey, Deputy Chief Accountant, 
U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission), we do not distinguish between fraud and earnings management. 
4  This is a well-known result in the analytical financial reporting literature. See the discussion in Fischer and 
Verrecchia (2000), for example. 
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 After observing the report, the auditor chooses the audit quality that minimizes his total 
conditional expected costs.  He has two costs to consider: (1) the potential liability from 
reporting bias that goes undetected; and, (2) the direct cost of audit quality.5  Finally, the 
market’s only objective is to set the firm’s price equal to its expectation of earnings that is based 
on all available information, including the earnings report and the inferred audit quality strategy. 
 In our comparative analysis, we show how various model parameters affect three key 
equilibrium outcomes: (1) the market's response to reported earnings (i.e., earnings 
informativeness or the earnings response coefficient, ERC); (2) the manager's expected bias; and 
(3) the expected audit quality.  Our analysis of the auditor's liability and cost parameters yields 
predictions that are well documented in the theoretical auditing literature.  For example, we find 
that lowering the cost of auditing leads to higher audit quality and lower expected bias. This is a 
well-known result in strategic auditing papers (see Newman and Noel 1989; Schwartz 1997; 
Newman, Patterson and Smith 2001; among others). The consistency between the predictions of 
our model and the literature provides some assurance as to the construct validity of our modeling 
assumptions.   
 In contrast, we glean new insights from our analysis of the manager’s incentive effects 
from the costs and benefits of biased reporting.  As one might expect, increases in the manager’s 
costs and decreases in the manager's benefit for reporting bias decrease expected reporting bias.  
However, the auditor reacts to a decrease in expected bias by reducing expected audit quality 
because the auditor's liability exposure for expected undetected bias decreases.  Due to the 
                                               
5  The auditor also receives a fee for his services, but the auditor's fee cannot depend on his choice of audit quality.  
All contingent fees are prohibited by both public and non-public audit standards.  Thus, we assume a game 
structure where subsequent to setting the auditor's fee, the auditor chooses a cost-minimizing strategy.  Much of 
the literature on strategic auditing includes this assumption. See Newman, Patterson and Smith (2001), for 
example. 
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market's inference that audit quality decreases, the market's response to the earnings report also 
decreases.   
A presumption in the empirical literature is that less reporting bias would result in more 
informative earnings.  This idea is so pervasive that more recent empirical studies focus directly 
on the manager’s decision to decrease reporting bias when the manager’s cost of bias increases 
(for a review, see Dechow et al.  2010), without considering how the interaction between the 
manager’s decision and audit quality might affect earnings informativeness.  Bias is presumed to 
be negatively correlated with financial reporting quality.  However, when we include 
endogenous audit quality in the analysis, this may no longer be the case, potentially opening new 
lines of research.  For example, what level of audit quality is required in order to maintain the 
same level of financial reporting quality when managerial costs of bias increase?   
 Our comparative analysis also shows that expected bias increases when the manager 
benefits more from higher reported earnings, as with compensation plans based on reported 
earnings.  At the same time, the market's response to the earnings report and expected audit 
quality increase.  When management compensation is more dependent on the earnings report, the 
auditor increases audit quality in response to the manager's greater incentive to over-report 
earnings.  The market views these changes as making the earnings report more informative.  
Dechow et al.'s (2010) review of the extant literature finds that the empirical evidence is mixed 
concerning the effects of managerial compensation on earnings informativeness.  Our study 
suggests that empirical observations of a positive association between compensation plans and 
earnings informativeness may be due to the auditor increasing audit quality in response to the 
expected increase in reporting bias, a link that is empirically testable. 
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 Unlike expected bias, expected audit quality is always positively associated with financial 
reporting quality, where any parameter change that induces an increase in expected audit quality 
also induces an increase in financial reporting quality.  This result links to the empirical literature 
and is particularly important, because as DeFond and Zhang (2014) note, “audit quality improves 
financial reporting quality by increasing the credibility of the financial reports (p.276).”  In our 
framework, where financial reporting quality reflects the usefulness of the financial reports, 
increases in the credibility of the financial reports result directly from increases in audit quality, 
and thus increase the market’s reaction to the financial report.   
Our paper incorporates aspects of two streams of research that study financial reporting 
and strategic auditing.  Similar to the strategic audit literature, we include a manager who has 
incentives for intentional misreporting and an independent auditor who wishes to minimize his 
expected costs associated with non-detection of an intentional misstatement and the costs of 
auditing.  Similar to the theoretical financial reporting literature, we focus on deriving a linear 
pricing function that reflects the manager's incentives and, in our case, the auditor's incentives.  
This linearity allows us to study the impact of the earnings report on the market price of the firm 
in a way that yields empirically testable predictions.   
Papers in the strategic audit literature that study the impact of the external auditor on the 
market price of the client firm include Chan and Pae (1998),  Newman, Patterson, and Smith 
(2005), and Beyer and Sridhar (2006).  However, these studies provide no basis for evaluating 
the importance of the earnings report on the market price of the firm because their analyses do 
not include an earnings report by the manager.  Consequently, they are silent regarding financial 
reporting quality.  Our paper is notable because we provide predictions on the association 
between the earnings report and the market’s reaction to the report, given the addition of a 
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strategic external auditor.  Other models, such as Newman and Noel (1989), Shibano (1990), 
Hillegeist (1999), and Laux and Newman (2010) either avoid the reporting issue altogether or 
assume a binary report.  
 Our paper also has elements similar to studies found in the theoretical financial 
accounting literature, such as Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), Dye and Sridhar (2004) and 
Caskey, Nagar, and Petacchi  (2010).  Both Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) and Dye and Sridhar 
(2004) develop rational expectations equilibria of market pricing in which the manager has 
private information about earnings and his own payoff-type.  Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) 
incorporate the manager's private information about his payoff-type by including a multiplicative 
random variable on the manager's benefit from firm pricing.  Alternatively, Dye and Sridhar 
(2004) include an additive random variable in the manager's cost function.  Because we are 
focused on deriving a linear equilibrium, we follow the Dye and Sridhar (2004) approach by 
including an additive random variable in the manager's cost function.  Caskey et al. (2010) add 
an audit committee as a strategic player to the Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) model, which 
functions as an additional layer of firm management in their study.  Their model does not include 
an external strategic auditor that provides endogenous audit quality. 
 Finally, in response to DeFond and Zhang's (2014) call for theoretical guidance for 
empirical research, our model ties to key points that DeFond and Zhang (2014) emphasize in 
their review of the empirical auditing literature.  First, DeFond and Zhang (2014) argue that 
contrary to the empirical treatment of audit quality as binary, audit quality is a continuous 
function.  We model audit quality in this fashion.  Second, DeFond and Zhang (2014) also 
review many definitions of audit quality, but point out that a fundamental attribute of audit 
quality is that it improves financial reporting quality.  Our definition of audit quality and the 
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results of our model are consistent with this attribute.   Next, the type of auditing we model is 
auditing for reporting bias, which DeFond and Zhang (2014) argue is the underpinning of the 
extant empirical literature.  Finally, our linear equilibrium provides a basis for applying an 
ordinary least squares approach, as is typically found in the empirical literature.  Together, the 
underlying assumptions and modeling choices of our paper answer DeFond and Zhang's (2014) 
call for theoretical guidance for future empirical auditing research.    
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we present a 
benchmark model in which audit quality is not strategic but exogenously fixed.  We add a 
strategic auditor in section 3 to obtain endogenous audit quality, provide a comparative analysis 
in section 4, and discuss the empirical implications of our analysis in section 5.  Finally, in 
section 6, we provide concluding remarks. 
2.  Benchmark model with exogenously fixed audit quality 
 We begin by considering a benchmark setting that describes the strategic interaction 
between a manager and the market with exogenously fixed audit quality.  Fixed audit quality 
implies that the probability of detecting reporting bias is independent of the report.6  Our 
benchmark setting provides a contrast to highlight how the addition of a strategic auditor affects 
the manager's reporting decision and the market's assessment of the report.  
 In our benchmark model, the manager privately observes the firm's earnings  and then 
issues a report r on earnings, where p is normally distributed with mean  and variance 
.  The probability that the auditor detects bias is .  The market then determines the 
firm’s stock price based on the manager's report and whether or	not bias is detected. 
                                               
6  The benchmark setting might be descriptive of instances where specialized audits are consistent with "fixed" 
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With no detection (ND), the market prices the firm at the expected value of earnings  
given  
 . (1) 
The market price with detection (D) is then equal to , because detection reveals the extent 
of bias. 7 
 When bias goes undetected, with probability , the manager obtains a benefit 
proportionate to the market price of equity , where  is the manager's benefit payoff 
parameter.  The parameter  depends on the manager’s equity holdings in the firm or a market-
based compensation plan.  Because holdings and compensation plans are common knowledge,  
is also common knowledge.  If bias is detected, the manager’s expected benefit is .  Thus the 
manager's total expected benefit is .   
 The manager also incurs a penalty of  where  is a cost payoff 
parameter and  represents the manager’s “type,” which is privately known to the manager and 
distributed normally with mean  and variance .8  The cost parameter q is common 
knowledge and determines the total cost based on the amount of bias.  The manager’s type  
reflects the manager's insensitivity to the penalty from bias.  As  increases, the penalty for bias 
is less effective in deterring bias.9  
                                               
7  We assume that when bias is detected, it is observable by the market. In addition to being reasonable given the 
strategic nature of our setting, this assumption provides simplicity and allows us to maintain a linear equilibrium. 
8  Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) include the manager’s private information about his type as the multiplier on 
market price, but assume that the manager's misreporting penalty is known.  In the model with a strategic 
external auditor that we present in section 3, no linear pricing equilibrium exists with the Fischer and Verrecchia 
(2000) structure.  See additional details in the Online Appendix.  Our expression for misreporting cost is 
consistent with Dye and Shridhar (2004), who also model the manager’s cost of biasing the report as uncertain.   
9  To facilitate our analysis and because  are continuous normal random variables, we assume, that  
 , and (3)  as well as  
π
r :
PND = E π | r( )
PD = π
1−δ( )




τE π | r( ) 1−δ( )+τπδ
q / 2( ) r −π − ε( )2 q > 0
ε
µε > 0 σε2
ε
ε
 π  and ε
(1) µπ > 0,  (2) 0 < σε < µε / 3 σπ < βk qµε + βτ )( ) / 3 1− β( ) kq + Lβτ( )( )
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One interpretation of the manager’s type is that it reflects the manager's disposition for 
dishonest behavior.  Audit standard AU-C 240.A1, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit, refers to this as rationalization as follows:  
Some individuals possess an attitude, character, or set of ethical values that 
allow them knowingly and intentionally to commit a dishonest act.   
 
The random variable  captures this idea, while the observable parameter q measures the overall 
strength of the manager's misreporting cost associated with overriding internal control, legal 
exposure, and loss of reputation. 
 The manager's total expected payoff, therefore, is equal to the following. 
  (2) 
 Lemma 1 provides the equilibrium strategies for the manager and the market based on  
expressions (1) and (2).  For expositional simplicity, we define  such that an  
increase in  corresponds to an increase in the relative informativeness about the manager's type.  
In addition, we define as expected reported earnings and . 
 LEMMA 1. The equilibrium strategies for exogenously fixed audit quality d are as follows. 
 Manager:   with . 
 Market:     and  
                                               
 (4) . The first three assumptions ensure that the manager 
overstates with high probability.  The fourth is associated with the requirement that audit quality lies between 0 
and 1.  However, we can also show that our equilibrium holds for extreme values of  that occur with low 
probability.  See the discussion and proof of these issues in the Online Appendix.  Similar assumptions 
associated with the normal distribution are also found in previous studies, such as Patterson and Smith (2003). 
ε
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  where   and    
   
(All proofs are in the appendix.) 
 The equilibrium in Lemma 1 holds whether or not audit quality is greater than zero.  If 
audit quality is zero , bias is never detected and the market price simply equals .  
Furthermore, Lemma 1 implies that market price, with no detection, can also be expressed as  
times unexpected reported earnings plus expected earnings. 
  (3) 
 
Because  represents the market's response to unexpected reported earnings (i.e., ERC), 
represents the market's assessment of financial reporting quality.  In this case,  because the 
manager’s report is characterized by  and the covariance of  with earnings 
simplifies to . 
 In this setting, reporting bias  is equal to , which is positive 
with high probability because we assume that  is sufficiently large and that  is 
sufficiently small (see footnote 9).  Reporting bias decreases as the exogenously fixed audit 
quality  increases or the manager’s cost parameter q increases  (or benefit parameter t 
decreases).  Reporting bias increases as more is known about the manager’s type relative to 
earnings (  increases), or the manager type  increases.  However, only  and  affect the 
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quality , affect the market price.  This is true because  is an additive component in both  
and  and thus cancels out in the computation of unexpected reported earnings  – . 
3. Model with endogenous audit quality 
 In this section, we add a strategic auditor who chooses the probability of detecting bias 
 after observing reported earnings r.10  As a result, the amount and effects of 





 We assume that the auditor’s fee is fixed prior to the auditor choosing d.  Thus, the 
auditor’s choice of d minimizes his expected costs.  This characterization of the auditor's 
expected payoff avoids contingent fees that are prohibited by the auditing standards.   
 In focusing on overstatements, the auditor‘s liability penalty is  and his 
conditional expected liability penalty is  whenever bias goes undetected.  The 
legal liability payoff parameter L reflects the auditor’s litigation or regulatory environment.  This 
is the typical litigation penalty found in the strategic audit literature (for example, see Chan and 
                                               
10  The actual sequence of events is that the auditor chooses the extent of audit procedures, which then determines 
audit quality.  For simplicity, we represent audit quality as the single choice of d. 
11  As noted previously, audit quality equals d and reporting bias equals r – p.  However, when audit quality is 
endogenous, both audit quality and reporting bias depend on realizations of the random variables p and .  
Consequently we use expected audit quality and expected reporting bias that provide overall measures of these 
two strategic variables in our comparative analysis in section 4.  
δ am r
E r( ) r E r( )
δ r( )∈ 0,1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
L r −π( )
L r − E π | r( )( )
ε
The auditor observes r and 
then chooses  
audit quality  
 
δ .
Based on his type and after his 
observation of actual earnings , the 
manager chooses report r.  In choosing r, 
the manager anticipates the strategic 
choices that the auditor and market would 





If no bias is detected, the  
market prices the firm at
;  
otherwise, the firm is priced at 
 
 
PND = E π | r⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
PD = π .
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Pae 1998; Patterson and Noel 2003; among others).  In financial reporting, the auditing standards 
and the auditing profession are most concerned with undetected overstatements, where 
understatements are typically associated with a zero litigation penalty (L = 0).  In addition, the 
auditor incurs a direct cost of  for choosing audit quality  where k is a cost parameter.  
For example, a larger k could be due to a more complex client firm environment, a smaller audit 
firm, or less familiarity with the client’s industry. As a result, the auditor’s total expected costs 
are as follows. 
 
  (4) 
 
 The auditor chooses audit quality  by minimizing his expected costs in expression (4).  
In contrast to the benchmark setting of exogenously fixed audit quality, the addition of a strategic 
auditor provides the basis for an endogenous choice of audit quality  that depends on reported 
earnings r.  The manager's expected payoff shown in expression (2) remains the same, except 
that  is now determined from the auditor's expected payoff in (4).12 
 Based on the expected payoffs defined in (1), (2) and (4), the equilibrium to the game 
with a strategic external auditor is found in Proposition 1.  
PROPOSITION 1. The equilibrium strategies for the manager, the auditor and the market 
 are as follows. 
  
  Manager:   
  Auditor:    
                                               
12  In order to obtain linear equilibria, and because it does not interfere with the basic auditor and manager tensions, 
we do not assume an explicit penalty for the manager when the auditor detects bias. The total expected benefit 
from bias  provides the strategic tension in our model and is consistent with previous 
strategic audit studies such as Newman et al. (1996) and Hillegeist (1999).  
k / 2( )δ 2 δ





r = bmπ + cmε + am.
δ = bAr + aA.
τ 1−δ( )E π | r( )+δπ( )
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  Market:    given no detection of bias and  given detection 
       where  , , , 
  , ,  
   and .  
In Proposition 1,  represents the responsiveness of the auditor to the manager’s reported 
earnings r.  While  is a cubic equation with three 
roots, we focus on the unique solution in which  and  are positive, real numbers.13  We also 
derive, as part of the proof to Proposition 1, the equilibrium values of expected bias  and 
expected audit quality . 
 COROLLARY 1. Based on Proposition 1:  
    and  .  
 Unlike the model in section 2 that exogenously fixes audit quality, the market price now 
depends on the manager's payoff parameters and  as well as the auditor's payoff parameters k 
and L.  Despite the elimination of  in unexpected reported earnings , the players' 
                                               
13  Professional standards suggest that the risk of overstatement increases as reported earnings increases and  
would be counter to this presumption. In addition, these expressions could be stated in closed form, but their 
complexity would add more confusion than intuition.  Thus, for simplicity, we express the equilibrium implicitly. 
We also perform reasonableness analyses on the equilibrium values of ,  and , which we include in the 
Online Appendix. 
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payoff parameters affect the report  and  through  and  solely due to the fact that 
.  As a result,  unambiguously increases relative to the benchmark setting (see Figure 1). 
(Place Figure 1 about here) 
 COROLLARY 2.  Financial reporting quality is greater with a strategic auditor   
  than with fixed auditing . 
 
 With a strategic auditor, based on Proposition 1, we can rewrite  as  
  (5) 
where  
Furthermore, based on expression (3), the market price  is equal to 
 . (6) 
Expression (6) illustrates the importance of the ratio  on the market price, .  
Because  depends on  (see Proposition 1), this ratio also depends on both the 
manager’s and auditor’s payoff parameters.  While the manager’s report is affected through 
individual changes in  for a change in any one of these parameters, only the change 
in  affects a change in .  Intuitively, as this ratio increases, the manager's report is less 
predictive of earnings, which in turn decreases the report’s informativeness.  In general,  
reflects the relative weightings that the manager puts on  and  in his reporting strategy. 
 Furthermore, Proposition 1 shows that the choice of audit quality can be expressed as  
r β bm cm
bA > 0 β
bA > 0( )
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  (7)  
where .   Expression (7) illustrates that the auditor’s choice of d  is driven 
by two factors: the expected bias  and the difference between the observed report and 
the anticipated report , which is unexpected earnings.  
 The use of in determining audit quality is analogous to the use of analytical 
procedures in determining the auditing plan.   PCAOB AS 1105.21, Audit Evidence, states:  
Analytical procedures consist of evaluations of financial information made by a 
study of plausible relationships among both financial and nonfinancial data. 
Analytical procedures also encompass the investigation of significant differences 
from expected amounts. (Emphasis added) 
The auditor forms his reporting expectations based on prior audits and current economic 
conditions.  Moreover, PCAOB AS 2110.46, Identifying and Assessing Risks of Material 
Misstatement, states that the auditor "should perform analytical procedures" in assessing the risk 
of material misstatements, which the auditor uses in choosing audit quality .  As increases, 
the auditor puts more weight on unexpected reported earnings in choosing audit quality. 
 The strategies presented in Proposition 1 form the basis for our comparative analysis 
presented in section 4 and our empirical predictions in section 5.  We examine how the key 
equilibrium values of financial statement quality, , expected bias  and expected audit 
quality , change with respect to a change in each of the model parameters (see Corollary 1 
and Proposition 1 for derivations of these key values). 
 
 
δ = bA r − E r( )( )+ E δ( ) = Lk 1− β( ) r − E r( )( )+ E bias( )( )
E δ( ) = L / k( )E bias( )
E bias( )
r − E r( )( )
r − E r( )( )
δ bA
β E bias( )
E δ( )
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4.  Comparative analysis  
 In this section, we first examine the effects of changes in the auditor’s incentives for 
auditing (the direct cost of audit quality k and the cost of auditor liability L) along with the 
manager’s incentives for bias (the cost of bias q and the benefit from bias ).  Subsequently, we 
examine the effects of changes in distributional parameters: the expected manager type , 
expected earnings , the variance of manager type , and the variance of earnings .  We 
provide the results of payoff and distributional parameters in separate Propositions because the 
discussion of related empirical implications discussed in section 5 focuses only on the payoff 
parameters.  Payoff parameters tend to be firm specific whereas distributional parameters tend to 
be associated with the general environment. 
 The comparative analysis related to the payoff parameters is partly driven by the direct 
and indirect effects that these payoffs have on the auditor's and the manager's strategic choices. 
Changes in the auditor’s liability cost L and cost parameter k affect audit quality directly.  The 
auditor chooses a higher expected audit quality for an increase in L, but a lower expected audit 
quality for an increase in k (direct effect).  The manager reacts (indirect effect) to these changes 
in expected audit quality by decreasing and increasing expected bias, respectively.  
 Similarly, the manager decreases expected bias as the cost of bias q increases and 
increases expected bias as the manager's benefit from bias  increases (direct effect).  The 
auditor reacts (indirect effect) to a lower (higher) expected bias by choosing a lower (higher) 
expected audit quality.   










 PROPOSITION 2.  The following table shows the effects of changes in the auditor and  
  manager payoff parameters on the key equilibrium values. 
 






quality   
Financial reporting 
quality (ERC)   
Cost of audit quality k + – – 
Cost of auditor 
liability L – + + 
    
Cost of managerial 
bias q – – – 
The benefit from 
managerial bias  + + + 
 
  Overall, changes in k and L affect  in the opposite direction from their effects on 
, whereas changes in q and  affect in the same direction as their effects on 
.  These directional differences result from the differences in the direct and indirect effects, 
as discussed above.  These interactive results are similar to those found in previous studies, such 
as Hansen (1993), Radhakrishnan (1999), Patterson and Smith (2007, 2016), among others.   
 Changes in the parameters k, L, q, and  affect  in the same direction as they affect 
.  Increases in do not cause increases in  but they are positively associated.  This 
characteristic is consistent with the assertion of DeFond and Zhang (2014) that higher audit 
quality is characterized by "greater assurance of high financial reporting quality."  As a result, 
the association between  and  is identical to the association between  and 
.   
E bias( ) E δ( ) β
τ
E bias( )
E δ( ) τ E bias( )
E δ( )
τ β
E δ( ) E δ( ) β
E bias( ) β E bias( )
E δ( )
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 As noted in our discussion following Corollary 2, the ratio  
represents the relative weighting of managerial-type and earnings in the manager’s reporting 
function.  It is the primary driver for determining the informativenes of reported earnings ( ) for 
any change in the payoff parameters.  In particular, increases in q decrease , but the 
increase in q also increases the relative weighting on manager-type  in the manager's reporting 
function. As a result, the manager's report is less predictive of earnings, which in turn decreases 
the report’s informativeness.  Consequently, financial reporting quality  decreases along with 
. This is in contrast to Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) who find that increases in q decrease 
, as we do, but that the decrease in  results in an increase in .    
 Alternatively, when auditor liability L increases or the cost of audit quality k decreases, 
the manager weighs earnings more in his reporting function.  As a result, financial reporting 
quality  increases along with a decrease in  and an increase in .  This maintains 
the positive association between  and , but  and  are negatively associated as in 
Fischer and Verrecchia (2000).  However, unlike Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) this negative 
association is only achieved in our setting with the addition of a strategic auditor that results in 
endogenous audit quality. 
 Next, we consider the effects of changes in the distributional parameters of our two 
random variables, manager-type  and earnings , on the key 
equilibrium values of , , and .  Based on the characterizations of , 
, and  in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, clearly changes in expected earnings  do not 
affect these key equilibrium values.  In addition, changes in the expected managerial-type  






E bias( ) E bias( ) β
β E bias( ) E δ( )
E δ( ) β E bias( ) β
ε ∼ N µε ,σε2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ π ∼ N µπ ,σπ2⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
E bias( ) E δ( ) β E bias( )
E δ( ) β µπ
µε
 20 
impact both expected bias  and expected audit quality  where both of these 
equilibrium values increase in .  As the manager's expected insensitivity to penalties  
increases, expected audit quality and expected reporting bias increase. 
 Alternatively, uncertainty about managerial-type and earnings, and , impact all of 
the key equilibrium values only through changes in , where  corresponds to 
the relative informativeness of the manager's payoff-type.  This is summarized in Proposition 3.  
PROPOSITION 3. An increase in  results in an increase in , , and .  
 
 An increase in is due to either a decrease in or an increase in .  As  increases, 
the market and auditor become relatively more informed about the manager’s payoff-type.  The 
effects of an increase in  are similar to those associated with the manager’s benefit payoff 
parameter .14  Financial reporting quality  increases at the same time that expected bias and 
expected audit quality increase.  These effects on  and expected bias are present whether or not 
the setting includes a strategic auditor (see section 2 and Fischer and Verrecchia 2000).  With a 
higher , the variation in reported earnings is more likely due to a variation in actual earnings 
rather than variations in the manager’s insensitivity to the misreporting cost.  Furthermore, 
despite reported earnings being more predictive of actual earnings, expected bias also increases.   
5.  Empirical implications 
This section focuses on the interpretations of the empirical evidence related to how 
reporting bias and audit quality affect financial reporting quality in light of our findings.  As 
                                               
14  As discussed previously, an increase in  results in a relatively smaller weight on manager-type in the 
manager’s reporting function, decreasing the variability of the manager’s report. Thus, financial reporting quality 
increases. However, this type of change is related to specific payoffs rather than the reporting environment, as is 
the case for an increase in . 
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DeFond and Zhang (2014) point out, the empirical literature has defined financial reporting 
quality across many dimensions, but we specifically address financial reporting quality in terms 
of earnings informativeness or earnings response coefficients (ERCs).  Early ERC research 
provides extensive empirical evidence that ERCs vary significantly with audit quality and with 
managerial incentives that affect reporting bias.  Our findings provide new insights into these 
observed associations.  
 The empirical literature to date has not considered how the auditor’s or manager’s 
reactions to changes in reporting bias or audit quality, respectively, may affect these 
associations.  In Proposition 2, we demonstrate that as the cost of reporting bias q increases or 
the benefit from reporting bias t decreases, expected bias decreases.  The auditor reacts to a 
decrease in expected bias by reducing audit quality.  Following the key finding of Proposition 2 
that the association between ERCs and expected audit quality is always positive, an increase 
in q or a decrease in t leads to a positive association between ERCs and expected reporting bias.   
               In contrast, Proposition 2 shows that as the cost of auditing k decreases or the cost of 
auditor liability L increases, expected audit quality increases.  The manager reacts to the increase 
in expected audit quality by decreasing reporting bias.  Because the association between ERCs 
and expected audit quality is always positive, a decrease in k or increase in L leads to a negative 
association between ERCs and expected reporting bias.  We depict these relations in Figure 2. 
 (Place Figure 2 about here) 
 To illustrate the implications of Proposition 2 on the interpretation of the empirical 
findings found in previous research, consider, for example, Warfield et al. (1995) who study the 
effects of managerial ownership on ERCs. They find a positive association between managerial 
ownership and ERCs.   
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 Within the framework of our model, the positive association that Warfield et al. (1995) 
document follows from the auditor’s reaction to the effects of higher managerial ownership on 
expected reporting bias.  Higher managerial ownership is expected to result in a higher benefit 
(higher t) and possibly a lower cost (lower q) to the manager for reporting biasedly.15  This is 
reflected in PCAOB Auditing Standard 2401.85 that identifies a "significant financial interest by 
the manager in the entity" as a fraud risk factor.  Thus consistent with the PCAOB, higher 
managerial ownership in our framework would induce increased managerial reporting bias and 
increased audit quality, resulting in the observed positive association between managerial 
ownership and ERCs.  
 Warfield et al. (1995) also document that discretionary accruals are lower when 
managerial ownership is high.  Discretionary accruals are often indicative of biased reporting.16   
Warfield et al. (1995) interpret this finding as evidence of higher managerial ownership leading 
to less reporting bias, which they attribute to their finding of a positive association between 
managerial ownership and ERCs.   
 Within the framework of our model, expected bias may be lower with higher managerial 
ownership if higher managerial ownership is correlated with other factors that influence the 
reporting environment.  For instance, the Board of Directors may recognize higher managerial 
                                               
15  In our model, t is characterized as the manager's share of firm value.  As managerial ownership increases, the 
benefit to the manager increases.  The influence of the manager over the firm’s operations is also likely to 
increase as managerial ownership increases.  Thus with higher levels of ownership, the manager can override 
internal controls or governance mechanisms more easily, characterized in our model as a lower cost q of bias. 
Other examples of managerial incentives that could affect both the costs and benefits of biased reporting include 
stock options (see Aboody 1996) and managerial ability (see Demerjian, Lev, and McVay 2012; Demerjian, Lev, 
Lewis, and McVay 2013).  In these examples, q increases because of the risk of stock option forfeiture or loss of 
managerial reputation.  An increase in t also results because the manager can increase the options value and 
protect his reputation through biased reporting.   
16  Discretionary accruals are an imperfect proxy for reporting bias.  For instance, neither the Jones nor the modified 
Jones discretionary accruals models (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995) would identify all forms of biased 
reporting.  Other proxies for biased reporting, such as accounting restatements or the mapping of accruals and 
cash flows (Dechow and Dichev 2002), are more likely to identify these other forms of biased reporting. 
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ownership as a fraud risk factor and respond (through the audit committee) by selecting an 
auditor from a big-N audit firm and/or an audit firm specializing in their particular industry.  A 
big-N auditor or an industry specialist faces a higher liability cost L, as well as reduced audit 
costs k due to a more efficient auditing technology.17 
 If higher managerial ownership is correlated with the selection of a big-N auditor or 
industry specialist, our framework predicts that higher managerial ownership may result in a 
decrease in reporting bias.  But an increase in managerial ownership also increases t  and likely 
decreases q, which our framework predicts may result in an increase in reporting bias.  
Therefore, whether we observe more or less reporting bias with higher managerial ownership 
depends on whether the downward pressure from changes in k and L are greater than the upward 
pressure from changes in t and q.  Warfield et al.'s (1995) results suggest that k and L dominate. 
However, regardless of the relative strengths from changes in L and k versus t and q and the 
resulting effects on expected bias, our results predict that managerial ownership is always 
positively associated with ERCs.  
 Warfield et al.'s (1995) study focuses on a single corporate governance choice that is 
associated with financial reporting.  More recent corporate governance studies focus on choices 
that decrease the manager’s incentive for biased reporting.  For instance, Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2008) and Dhaliwal, Naiker, and Navissi (2010) provide evidence that reporting 
bias (measured as accounting conservatism and accruals quality, respectively) is lower when the 
board chooses an accounting expert to serve on the audit committee.    
                                               
17  Consistent with our characterization of a big-N audit firm as exhibiting higher audit quality (higher L, lower k), 
Teoh and Wong (1993) document that ERCs are higher for big-N audit firms than for non-big-N audit firms.   
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 The premise of Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) and Dhaliwal et al. (2010) is that the 
oversight of management is higher when an accounting expert serves on the audit committee.  
Within our framework, the increase in the oversight of management increases the cost of biased 
reporting (higher q) and results in less reporting bias.  Both Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008)  
and Dhaliwal et al.'s (2010) results are consistent with this prediction.   
 The audit committee is also charged with the hiring of the external auditor, among other 
responsibilities (see SOX, Section 301).  The auditing literature suggests that audit committees 
with an accounting expert are more likely to hire a big-N auditor and/or an auditor specializing in 
the firm’s industry (for a discussion, see DeFond and Zhang 2014).  Within our framework, a 
big-N auditor or industry specialist (lower k, higher L) also results in less reporting bias.  
Therefore, the observed decrease in biased reporting when an accounting expert serves on the 
audit committee could result from either the committee’s increased oversight of management or 
the committee’s selection of auditors.   
 While the effect on reporting bias is the same under either scenario, our framework 
predicts that increased oversight would induce lower audit quality, but the choice of a big-N 
auditor or industry specialist would induce higher audit quality.  Therefore, whether we observe 
higher or lower ERCs when an accounting expert serves on the audit committee depends on 
whether the upward effects on audit quality from changes in k and L are greater than the 
downward effects from changes in q.  Again, this is because the association between expected 
audit quality and ERCs is always positive.   
 Neither Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) nor Dhaliwal et al. (2010) consider how ERCs 
vary when an accounting expert serves on the audit committee.  This relation is tested in Bryan, 
Liu, Tiras, and Zhuang (2013) who find that the positive association between audit committees 
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and ERCs is stronger when the committee includes an accounting expert, suggesting that the 
changes in k and L dominate.  However, Bryan et al. (2013) find this result to hold only when the 
selection of an accounting expert aligns with key firm characteristics.18  For those audit 
committees with an accounting expert that do not align with key firm characteristics, Bryan et 
al.’s (2013) lack of findings could result from these audit committees being less likely to select a 
big-N auditor or industry specialist, or from the effects of k and L on audit quality not 
dominating the effects from a higher q.   
6.  Concluding remarks 
 The discussion above highlights the importance of answering DeFond and Zhang's (2014) 
call for conceptual guidance to disentangle the relation between audit quality and the manager’s 
reporting strategy.   Without the benefit of this conceptual guidance, early ERC research, such as 
Warfield et al. (1995), have led empirical researchers to simply presume that the association 
between reporting bias and ERCs is negative.  As such, more recent studies on reporting bias 
limit their focus to examining whether differences in managerial incentives affect specific 
earnings characteristics (i.e., accruals quality, conservatism, among others) that proxy for 
reporting bias (for a review, see Dechow et al. 2010).   
 Within the framework of our study, the presumed negative association between expected 
reporting bias and ERCs may occur when managerial incentives are correlated with the choice of 
auditor or other changes in a firm’s reporting environment.  However, if changes in the 
manager’s incentives are not correlated with the board’s corporate governance choices, or other 
reporting incentives, our framework predicts a positive association between expected reporting 
                                               
18  In the post-SOX era, both the NYSE and NASDAQ require listed companies to include a financial expert on the 
audit committee.  A firm’s Board of Directors may choose a financial expert who is also an accounting expert. 
.      
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bias and ERCs.  To date, the empirical literature has yet to consider these possibilities.  For 
instance, Bryan et al. (2013) did not consider whether ERCs vary when audited by a big-N or 
non-big-N auditor and when the selection of an accounting expert on the audit committee aligns 
with key firm characteristics. 
 Our framework provides conceptual guidance for future empirical studies to disentangle 
whether the dominant effects of including an accounting expert on the audit committee, or other 
changes to a firm’s corporate governance, is an improvement to the oversight of management or 
an improvement in the selection of auditors.  This distinction is important not only to accounting 
researchers, but also to regulators, as they consider increasing the requirements placed on audit 
committees and expanding the audit committee’s responsibilities.  Our framework suggests that 
future research could address the usefulness of any proposed changes by examining whether they 






Summary of notation 
 
Stochastic variables: 
 True earnings – observed privately by the manager 
 Expected earnings – common knowledge 
 Variance of earnings – common knowledge 
 Manager’s insensitivity to bias – observed privately by the manager 
 Expected manager insensitivity to bias – common knowledge 
 Variance of the manager’s insensitivity to bias – common knowledge 
 Relative measure of uncertainty about earnings and the manager’s private 
incentives for reporting bias: equal to  
Payoff parameters (all common knowledge): 
 Manager’s cost of bias parameter 
 Manager’s benefit parameter relative to the market price of the firm 
 Auditor’s cost parameter that determines the direct cost of audit quality 
 Auditor’s liability parameter for undetected bias 
Manager's strategy: 
 The manager’s linear report based on true earnings and the manager’s 
insensitivity to bias:  
 The intercept of reported earnings 
 The weight given to true earnings in reported earnings 
 The weight given to the manager’s insensitivity to bias in reported earnings 
Auditor’s strategy: 
 The auditor’s choice of audit quality based upon the manager’s reported 
earnings:  
 The intercept of the audit quality choice 
 The weight given to reported earnings in the auditor’s audit quality choice 
Market response to reported earnings: 
 The market price if the auditor does not detect bias:  
 The intercept of  
 The market’s response to reported earnings in  
 The market price if the auditor detects bias:  
Expected amounts of bias and audit quality (detection probability): 
 Expected reporting bias  
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Proof of Lemma 1. 
We start by assuming that the manager's reporting strategy is linear in  and then show 
that it is linear in equilibrium. 
 
Let  where  are the manager's strategic choices in the reporting 
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From (2) we have 
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Setting the above equal to zero and solving for , we find that 
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Proof of Proposition 1.  
 
Next assume that  (which we will show is true in equilibrium). 
 From expression (2) we have 
. 
Note that , so that the solution to  gives us the manager’s maximizing choice. 
When we set , we obtain  
Thus, ,  and  . 




In addition, , where . 
Next, note from (4) that  
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Setting (A1) =  0, we get
 
 . 
Also from (A1) we find that  so that the solution for minimizes the auditor’s expected 
costs. 
Thus,  
   where   and . 
Note that based on the above results,  and 
. 
  
Proof that . 
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Proof of the uniqueness of  and . 
Note that if  is unique, then it follows that  is unique. 
From Proposition 1 we know that 
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Then, using implicit differentiation we get 
 as long as bA > 0. 
 
The solution for bA in expression (A2) is a root to a cubic polynomial (there are three of them) 
but we only want the root that is finite, real, and corresponds to ,  .  Now  
based on its definition. 
Suppose , then there is a unique solution of  .  We require that  because 
 and we also require that . 
Let , then there are two solutions of . 
Now because  at  with  and , the solution at  
must be .  (If , then  for , which contradicts ). 
 
Thus,  and  with  at  and  with . 
 
Proof of Corollary 2. 
Based on Expression (5), Lemma 1 and Proposition 1,  when   
Moreover, using  as defined in Proposition 1,  . 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
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Thus,  . 
 




Also note that  = . 
Thus the increase in the ratio  due to an increase in q, is the main driver of the 
corresponding decrease in  based on Expression (5). 
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Thus,  decreases in q (increases in ) while  increases in q (decreases in ). 
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Note that based on the results presented above that   and .  
    
  
 
Proof that . 
 
As before, we know that: 
 
  
 because  
 because  
Next, consider : 
,  
because, as we have shown above,  and we have assumed (see footnote 9) 
that  where  . 
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kτ qµεβ L⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ +τβ L⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2
+ q −k + Lµε( ) ′β L⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )
kq + Lτβ L⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )2
< 0





L > µε > Max 0,
−Lτβ2 − k2q ′β k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦









−τβ 2 + kq ′β L⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
q β + L ′β L⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )
=
−Lτβ2 − k2q ′β k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
Lq β − k ′β k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )
−Lτβ2 − k2q ′β k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
Lq β − k ′β k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )




τ Lqµεβ k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + Lτβ k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2
+ kq k − Lµε( ) ′β k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )
kq + Lτβ k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )2
> 0
k
L > µε > Max 0,
−Lτβ2 − k2q ′β k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦










Furthermore,  when  or  where relatively more is 
known about the manager's type versus earnings.  Thus, the assumption  suffices when 
.  A sufficiently large  is consistent with the manager's insensitivity to overstatement 
penalties. 
Finally, note that .  Thus, a  
always exists such that  .  
 




Because .  Thus, . 
 
Recall that . 
 






−Lτβ2 − k2q ′β k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
Lq β − k ′β k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )




γ >1 / 2 µε
−Lτβ2 − k2q ′β k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
Lq β − k ′β k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )
<
−k2q ′β k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
Lq β − k ′β k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )
= k
L
−kq ′β k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦





L > µε > Max 0,
−Lτβ2 − k2q ′β k⎡⎣ ⎤⎦

















Lq3 q + bAτ( )
k q2 − bA




k 1− β( ),   β = 1− bA kL dβdγ = − dbAdγ kL > 0
E δ( ) = L qµε + βτ( )kq + Lβτ =
L
k E bias( )
dE bias( )
dγ =
kq k − Lµε( )τ ′β γ[ ]
kq + Lτβ γ[ ]( )2
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Figure 1  The change in  as q increases for the case with strategic auditing (bA > 0)   




                 
  
β






bA > 0, the case with strategic auditing  
bA = 0, the benchmark case 
 β = γ
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Figure 2  Empirical implications of changes in independent variables that proxy for the cost (q) 
 and benefit (t) of biased reporting, the cost of auditing (k), and the auditor's liability 
 (L) cost on financial reporting quality 
  
 
 
 
